July 21, 2003

Space Commercialization: Towards A New Star

The standard caveats apply.

While I could go for another week or two discussing commercial research that has been done in space and microgravity, I will not bother. The fact is, that while it is fascinating and offers the potential for restoring eyesight, providing new treatments, new plants, and a host of other fascinating things, the problem remains that it is only potential.

For all the time spent in space, the amount of time given over to commercial research is less than miniscule. Allegedly knowledgeable people write about the failure of space manufacturing, space research, and more; yet, the fact remains that it is impossible to determine if it has failed or not because there is not sufficient data to make the judgment.

There were a host of promises made by NASA and others when the Shuttle came online, of a new era of research, development, and production. The problem is that launch schedules could not be met and that a reliable schedule could not be developed. For both fundamental researchers and commercial researchers, it often took years to get an experiment flying. While this may be acceptable in the academic community, it is completely unacceptable for commercial research. Companies need to do research now, not five years from now. They need a firm schedule, they need fixed costs, and they need reliability.

Despite the problems, commercial research has made it up on NASA through the Space Product Development Program. Yet, despite its many successes, and proven leverage that has consistently been above a 2:1 ratio, the program may well be killed.

So what?

NASA has never been a true supporter of the commercialization of space despite legal mandates. NASA-funded researchers and the research community at NASA Headquarters have never seen commercial research as a positive, only an enemy. Many would rather see research programs and efforts die rather than switch to using commercial hardware. This despite the fact that commercial researchers recognized the need to automate and reduce crew time years ago, that they have proven systems, and that it can indeed do the job. The fact remains that they would rather spend millions or hundreds of millions to develop a facility that will be of limited use or one-time use instead of using fully-capable and adaptable off-the-shelf commercial hardware.

The NIH syndrome is not limited to just one area of NASA. One NASA center is developing entirely new plant growth hardware, rather than use the proven commercial hardware. The reasons given for this are specious, in my opinion, but a quick look at the budget, jobs provided the center, and other such things does give one some ideas of why it is needed.

Nor is NASA management much better. The previous administrator talked commercialization, but the focus was on finding companies to pay for what NASA wanted to do, rather than what industry wanted to do. These efforts, along with the major commercial achievements of the man brought in to oversee them, fell flat because they focused on NASA and not on industry. Current management is all for starting new programs, with JSC continuing to be the tail wagging the dog, while throwing out all that has been obtained.

Make no mistake, a great deal has been accomplished. Some areas of research have not panned out, but many others have been identified. There are quite a few areas that industry might be willing to pay a reasonable price to explore, provided that they can get the right price, a reliable launch schedule, and the right access. The commitments made to and through the Space Product Development prove this in the only way that matters: cash and in-kind contributions. Industry is willing to pony up if approached in the right way and in support of industry’s reasons.

Since NASA appears to be at best lukewarm, if not in full opposition, how then can the markets be identified and explored?

First, build on what has been done. The Commercial Space Centers funded by NASA have developed reliable and capable hardware that has been proven in flight. It is designed for low power consumption, minimal space requirements, high automation, and other positive attributes. There is a good base of data from the commercial research, some of which is not proprietary. That which is would suggest some markets to go after. Even if NASA were to kill the program, the expertise, hardware, and such may then be available on the market.

If NASA doesn’t kill the program, that expertise and such is still there, and the centers will have a strong incentive to work with private launch companies as a means of generating additional revenue streams.

Second, there has to be a way to make money at getting the data that will identify and open up new commercial markets. It may be as a “marriage broker” between researchers, research centers, and launch companies. It may well be something else. The fact is that what little data there is suggests strongly several very promising avenues for commercial exploration and exploitation. If anyone wants to talk to me about this idea, or in finding what they need, just give me a call.

Launch companies need to be taking a hard look at this. Satellites are not a good business model, it needs to be broader. The fact is that a company that can provide reliable access to short-, medium-, and long-duration microgravity is going to have a very nice competitive edge. There are paying customers who want and need this service at a good price. A company that would be willing to put a bit into providing something like a KC-135 flight, and can provide other access as well can and will get the research market.

It is also important to remember that volume is not really the issue, yet. The most important thing to come from commercial research will be the data, followed by samples. This does not necessarily require the space equivalent of a 747, it can be done on a smaller scale for now.

A space operations company is also viable in this environment. It has been proven that a good bit of commercial research needs longer times on orbit. Automated stations would work for some of the initial research, and crewed stations can come later. As long as data remains the primary product, many things are possible.

Moon and asteroid mining, energy collection, on-orbit manufacturing, and other such things are nice and laudable goals, but they are pipe dreams as far as the investment community is concerned. They are unproven and unprovable for the foreseeable future. What is needed to get there and make them viable are established commercial launch and service companies. Getting those companies funded as they should be funded requires existing markets with proven investments and investment opportunities.

The fact is that there is a market for commercial research in space and microgravity, even if it is currently limited to helping prove or disprove possibilities. The true potential for commercial research and commercial development remains to be determined. In doing this, the potential is there for people to make money on the initial exploration, and to clean up on what pans out.

While the foundation has not truly been laid for this, there is at least a cornerstone. What is needed now is for private companies to step forward and seize the opportunity. From that foundation, real space industrialization can be built.

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Posted by wolf1 at July 21, 2003 02:06 PM | TrackBack
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