The Laughing Wolf

The War: What Lies Beneath

The subject of this post really requires a serious book to cover, but for now this will have to do. Rather than take on the entirety, Iraq provides a useful tool for gaining a glimpse of what lies beneath the history discussed yesterday, and the choices we face in the days ahead.

The term “useful fools” was allegedly used by Lenin to describe those who supported the Revolution without having any true understanding of what they were doing or about the Revolution itself. This has come to have a broader meaning, and yet it remains both a valid term and a good tool for analyzing what lies beneath. Iraq very clearly shows both the power and the danger of this concept on both the macro and micro levels, and the danger of binary thinking.

The fact is that Iraq and its leader both served as a useful fool for a variety of interests, and made full use of useful fools elsewhere in support of its imperial ambitions. Even as other countries were using it for this purpose, they were being used as well. Nor did such use stop there. It can and should also be said that Iraq was a useful tool as well, for that is where things started.

Saddam’s rise to power was not an earthshaking event for most, including his neighbors. The methods used, his reliance on clan, and other such factors were pretty much par for the course. From the start, he made full use of others to advance and enhance his position.

The Soviet Union/Russians were very interested in him because he not only could prove to be a client state, he was also a client state who could pay in cash and other coin. He provided a ready market for weapons and systems, military advisors, and other delights. As Soviet fortunes changed, the relationship changed as well as he became a bulkwark for the Soviet presence in the Middle East. Through him, they balanced the U.S. presence in the region and managed to make money at the same time.

Yet, there was more to it than mere hard currency. What better place to test and develop than someone else’s country? What better place to spread or foment discord than through an intermediary? Finally, what better place to counter the growing Islamic/Islamic fundamentalism problem in parts of the Soviet Union, than through a Middle Eastern state?

Nor was the Soviet Union the only one playing this game. France was also involved, well past its eyebrows. At this point, France had only the most tenuous claim to being a world power, a fact that grated raw upon it. The empire was gone, client states were in revolt, and the economy was in shambles. A significant part of this economy was a weapons production complex intended to show that France was indeed still a major player in the world. France alone could not keep it afloat, so exports were needed. Iraq was a major market for that, for nuclear systems, and more. In return, France and her politicians could count on hard currency, oil, and other delights flowing their way.

There were deeper games here as well. France was determined to be a presence in the world, and that mean that it had to oppose both the U.S. and the U.S.S.R. France wanted and needed to be a superpower, a kingmaker, and more, and Iraq gave it the perfect opportunity.

Saddam’s neighbors were also involved in things. They may or may not have liked him at the start, but most importantly he was a semi-known quantity. The main parts were simple: he wanted power and more power. He wanted a dynastic reign and to become, in effect, yet another Arab royal family. This and related issues were well understood and used by the neighbors.

As with the others, there were currents below the surface as well. There was the need to have him on board in terms of oil, so that OPEC and the Middle East could maintain and expand economic power. There was the fact that Iraq could also be useful in developing weapons to use against Israel, weapons that could then be decried by said neighbors once Israel was no more. There were also minor things like port and ocean access, trade routes, and other factors as well. As the years went on, Saddam became an integral part of slowing down the Islamic revolution and the spread of fundamentalism (and the rise of the Mullahs).

The United States as interested in Iraq for the obvious Cold War reasons, but also because it provided a means to fight against both the Islamic Revolution and OPEC. It was a long-shot, but Iraq and Saddam offered a means of slowing the revolution and as a secular state very interested in number one, it also provided a potential lever for moderating OPEC. The U.S. neither liked nor trusted Saddam, but saw him as a temporarily useful tool for a brief time.

Bin Laden was interested in Saddam for several reasons. First, he could provide funds. More importantly, however, was that he could provide areas for training, intelligence for operations, weapons of all types, and serve as a lightning rod to keep attention focused away from ben Laden and his merry band. If he succeeded in his dreams, so much the better for it would be a blow to the U.S. and the fall of the House of Saud. If he was destroyed, no great loss (infidel and all) and potential gain yet again. .

Saddam, on the other hand, saw all of the above as both useful tools and useful fools. Everyone was a source of cash, weapons, technology, and the power he craved. His goals were far more lofty than many realized, for ultimately he wanted the majority of the Middle East as his kingdom. A student of history, he was fascinated by Hitler and Stalin, and made full use of certain lessons.

One of them was to keep track of his “friends” and the gifts provided. He bought what he could, and people of influence were merely a tool for him. The records he kept were more than simple accounting, they were a lever to use against those “friends” at need. What use the carrot without the lash?

He was also aware of the original “useful fools” concept and played to it. Like many in power, he was aware of both the Wilsonians and the utopianists who came to the fore around the time of WWI. Just as such people supported Lenin and the Revolution, Saddam knew that they could be brought into play to support him. They would either never see or would overlook the truth in support of the dream. They would be useful in delaying actions against him, or in encouraging support of him and they were a part of his plan from the start.

So, between being a useful tool and being thought a useful fool, he built his power and position. Somewhere in the process, however, he began to believe his own propaganda. To make it worse, no one would tell him the truth about things out of fear, for themselves, and their families. The stories got out, but were easy to dismiss as fantasies, for who would believe tales of mass murder, random and systematic rape, torture, and more in this enlightened age? Mere lies, of course, spread by enemies of Saddam and the utopian dream.

Kuwait was the miscalculation writ large for the world to see. It exposed the fallacy of the neighbors who thought they could control him. It exposed the fallacy of the Soviets/Russians who thought they could control him. It confirmed for the U.S. that he was a danger and not subject to control. It made him even more valuable to bin Laden, because it not only presented an opening to be exploited, it also brought the United States into the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia, and opened the full doors to jihad. It also exposed the problems in the system to Saddam and his top advisors, but these were things they did not want to see.

There were lessons aplenty, but many were lost or ignored in the chaos. We must not loose them today, even in retrospect, for they still play large upon the world stage.

Tomorrow: The Present.

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