The Laughing Wolf

A New Intelligence Authority

It is the buzzthought of the moment, endorsed by all: the need for a new intelligence czar. That there are severe problems with intelligence activities and analysis is beyond dispute, but it is not clear that a new layer of bureaucracy is the answer. This is a road that we have been down before, a road that has led us to the position in which we now find ourselves.

Take a good look at the name: Central Intelligence Agency. Take a good look at the title: Director of Central Intelligence. The CIA and its director were established to bring together all the different agencies and activities and provide central oversight for same. Yet, because the agency was also tasked with collecting intelligence – and thus had its own axe to grind – and because the director lacked real teeth for dealing with other agencies, the position quickly devolved into just another intelligence chief of just another agency.

Not to say that the CIA and the DCI did not try: read any of the good histories out there (and even some of the very, very bad ones) and it is clear that they did try. The other agencies resisted assimilation, both for very good reasons and for reasons of bureaucratic survival. Both remain important factors and are key to changing American intelligence.

One thing oft overlooked is that there need to be different agencies, who look at different things. Specialization is critical to gathering useable intelligence. You need people who know the area in question, who know what to look for, what questions to ask, and who have the background to recognize things that don’t fit a pattern or that create an entire new pattern. There is a historical tendency in a large organization/oversight group for this to get lost, sometimes with disastrous results. Many examples abound, from England’s early efforts to more recent events in the days leading up to 9-11.

The desire for bureaucratic survival will run rampant as well. No one likes to give up the money, power, and prestige they currently have. This applies not just to the obvious agencies, but to the less known ones as well. Even Congress has its own intelligence services – particularly for analysis – in place, and you can bet that they will fight to keep such in place no matter the cost (on any level). It will take true holding of feet to the fire to make any change in organization happen.

Yet, there is a clear need for some form of centralized control and oversight. While having different agencies is needed, there is a need to be sure that they are not hurting each other’s efforts – as has happened all too often in the past – and to ensure that true efficiencies can be exploited. A second component of this is a need to review the analysis provided by different groups. There is a tendency by any agency to present it’s viewpoint as the absolute truth (slam dunk, anyone?) and to ignore all else. A good intelligence précis, however, will present the prevailing opinion, differences in scope, and dissenting opinions as well. Otherwise, what reaches the leadership can be overprocessed if you will.

If this latest effort is to be done right, there are some key points that need to be in at the start.

First, the new position needs real teeth to bring all existing agencies and operations together – civilian, military, and Congressional. This will mean not merely organizational oversight, but the ability to re-organize as needed, control budgets, and other authority needed to get the job done.

Second, it must not be an intelligence agency in its own right. This was one of the things that doomed the DCI/CIA effort from the start, and to do so again would be expensive folly. Yes, the new position and organization will need a way to fact check what is being presented to it, but this can be done through both existing agencies and the continuation of unofficial efforts to backstop agencies and analysis. It does not require a massive staff or collection ability of its own.

Third, it will need to be as independent as possible. Beholden to none should help ensure fair and balanced analysis, and it needs to encourage opinions and analysis that is not politically popular.

Reforming intelligence will not be an easy, cheap, or quick process. There are entrenched cultures, entrenched bureaucrats, and entrenched special interests. There is a lot of good, however, on which to build and we have a clear view of the failures of the past where such efforts are concerned. Our safety depends on setting aside narrow self-interest and power-building, learning from the past, and doing the job right. It is up to each of us to make sure that our congresscritters and other elected representatives understand this, and act appropriately.

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